Crazy Close to the Real Thing: Questioning the Value of AI Companions 

Chapter on The Palgrave Handbook on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence by the Working Group 4

This chapter examines the rapid rise of AI companionship—illustrated by Friend.com’s “always-on” wearable assistant—and asks whether such systems can count as friends or durably relieve loneliness. We define AI companions as LLM-based agents designed to simulate responsive, caring partners (friend, confidant, lover, even deceased relative). While acknowledging user-reported benefits and therapeutic promise, we defend three claims: (1) in the canonical sense of friendship, reciprocal person-level commitment, accountability, and shared vulnerability are absent, so one cannot be friends with conversational AIs; (2) many short-term gains (feeling heard, cared for) arise from design features—anthropomorphic framing, asymmetric dependence, and data-driven attunement—that render the value fragile and potentially deceptive; and (3) at scale, commercial incentives and displacement effects risk deepening isolation, crowding out human ties, and normalizing surveillance-mediated intimacy. We close with design and policy implications aimed at mitigating harm while resisting the substitution of artificial companions for human relationships.

“The way of loving that is appropriate for lifeless objects is not called friendship since there’s no reciprocal loving involved and no wishing for the object’s good (for it would presumably be ridiculous for someone to wish good things for his wine, but if indeed it happens, it is for its preservation that he wishes, in order to have it for himself). But to a friend, it is said, we must wish good things for his own sake.”

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.

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